Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for this warm welcome.
It’s a great pleasure and a great honour to be here, in particular in Dublin in Ireland.
I was 12 years old when my parents brought me the first time to Ireland,
and I have to admit I grew up in the southern part of Germany,
in Bavaria, and I felt very much at home in Ireland, at that time,
because there are so many similarities between Bavaria and Ireland.
Now I have to live in Berlin, in Brandenburg in Potsdam.
And for a Bavarian this is a kind of living in exile, right.
And so we have a saying in Bavaria, it’s in Latin.
It says, extra Bavariam, nulla vita, non est vita sit…est….
no sorry, extra Bavariam nulla vita, et si vita, non est ita,
which basically says, outside Bavaria there is no life,
but if there’s a life it’s not the true one.
You gave me the opportunity here in Dublin to escape my exile from Prussia,
and I feel very much at home here.
In the 90s I spent two months in Dublin,
participating in an English course.
But you shouldn’t be worried, so my imperfect English is not a fault of the Irish people,
it’s my own fault.
Today, what I intend to do is, to talk about the mitigation of climate change.
And before I do this, I would like to explain you a little bit what the mandate of IPCC is.
Within the mandate of IPCC we have to explore the solutions base,
what kind of solutions are available for the decision-makers.
And we have to be policy relevant without being policy prescriptive.
And this is a very daunting task, in particular in working group 3,
because if you think about pathways towards low stabilisation
we have to talk about the energy mix.
And then you have to talk about technologies,
like nuclear power, like renewables, like carbon capture and storage.
And it is very hard to be neutral on that.
So what does it mean, when in working group 3 we tried to achieve a consensus on that?
It means that we perceive ourselves within the IPCC as a kind of a map maker.
We want to be explicit about the different pathways,
inform the policy makers, about the risks and opportunities of these different pathways.
But we feel it is not our mandate as cartographers
to prescribe what the navigator should do.
There’s a clear division of labour between the cartographers and the navigators.
And this is very important for us.
Because if there is no agreement what kind of energy mix is the best,
then we have tried to explore the different pathways,
and being explicit about the costs, the opportunities and the risks.
This is one very important aspect, when I try to communicate the results.
The second one is for 90% of my talk I will be very faithful to the underlying report.
At the very end of my talk I would like to talk a little bit about the European climate policy.
And here I switch my hat.
I will not speak as a co-chair of IPCC, I will speak as an economist.
Because it seems to me it is worthwhile to facilitate the discussion
that I share with you my perception of the European climate policy.
But this argument at the very end, and I will highlight this explicitly,
should not be assigned to the IPCC.
Another important aspect is quite important to understand
what we are doing in the IPCC.
Our report has basically 2000 pages.
It’s a worthwhile read over a weekend.
And this has basically three layers.
The first layer is the summary for policy makers.
This has around 9,000 words,
and this 9,000 words has to be approved basically by all the governments.
We did this in April in Berlin.
It is clear that the summary for policy makers represents the consensus
between the scientists and the governments.
Probably you have heard that some of the material has been deleted
because the governments couldn’t agree on the material.
In that sense there is some material in our report which governments do not like.
However, the governments have no right to change the underlying report.
They can say, we disagree what scientists want to tell us.
If you want to have the full information you have to look at the technical summary.
And this is what I will do.
I will show you all the same material from the technical summary.
Because my feeling is, it’s my duty to communicate
what is the underlying consensus of the scientists.
And then you have the chapters,
and the chapters cannot be changed or even influenced by the governments.
This is within the responsibility of the authors.
We had 235 authors, 900 reviewers.
And in the end what you can see here is,
is a huge amount of material.
And in my presentation I will select a few of the basic messages.
Now the first question we had is a very simple one.
What happened in the past?
What are the trends in stocks and flows of greenhouse gas emissions?
It is very important to understand the past.
Otherwise we cannot appreciate what we should
and what options we have for the future.
Now my first message is, in very simple and plain language,
emissions are rising, rising, rising.
Despite of worldwide mitigation efforts, and even despite of the financial crisis,
we have seen in the last decade even the largest
and the highest growth rate of emissions.
So this has many reasons.
And I will explain to you that reason in a few minutes.
But it is also important to understand not only to look at the flows of the annual emissions,
it is important also to understand the stock of emissions.
The stock of emissions represents the cumulative amount
of emissions humankind has released so far,
since industrialisation into the atmosphere.
And it is worthwhile to note that about half of cumulative CO2 emissions
since industrialisation have occurred in the last 40 years.
And you can also see here that new players entered the stage.
The economies in transition, Asia and even Latin America.
So you might perceive this picture,
this slide as a kind of an innocent slide about the past.
But this is not at all an innocent slide.
Because many governments felt that if we talk about
the cumulative emissions of the past
some could conclude historical responsibility.
Who is responsible for what?
Who has used the limiting disposal space of the atmosphere most in the past?
And you can see from a simple fact with a few additional value judgements
you can launch a very heated debate about past responsibility
and derived from the past responsibility future rights to use emissions.
And this was the reason why this slide was so highly contentious.
But nevertheless we felt as scientists we have to inform the policy-makers what happened in the past.
Now we observed that one of the most important drivers
for emissions is economic activity, income.
And therefore we tried to understand what happened in the past
and we have characterised the different countries along the famous income categories.
And the basic message, I will explain the details in a few seconds,
but the basic message of this slide is, all countries around the globe reiterate,
recapitulate the economic history of the high income countries.
Based on historical insights, based on historical emissions,
we do not observe any kind of leap-frogging.
We do not observe that any kind of country groups have chosen a different path.
All of them rely heavily on the use of fossil fuels,
which basically means achieving economic growth
and escaping the poverty trap is basically possible,
at least in the perception of many countries,
when they rely on the use of coal, oil and gas.
And what you can see in this picture we have here,
the small income countries, they contribute also to the emissions.
Basically due to the fact that they increase deforestation.
Then you have the lower middle income countries.
Here the deforestation plays an important role,
but then energy becomes more important.
And if you go to the upper middle income countries the energy sector,
the transport sector and the industry sector becomes even more important.
And if you go to the rich countries,
so then you can see that the transport sector has an increasing role in economic development.
And you have to understand that this is almost burned in the memory of many negotiators.
They have the feeling that escaping the poverty trap
and achieving human well being you have to rely on fossil fuels.
And there is some point in this,
because based on the historical data
we haven’t seen so far any kind of leap-frogging.
What are the reasons for these increasing emissions?
And for that reason we have decomposed the growth rate into four components.
Here you can see the growth rate of the emissions,
and you can see here what I already told you.
That we have an increasing growth rate of emissions.
But there are basically four factors.
The first and most important factor is economic growth.
I told you already this.
And economic growth becomes more and more important,
and population growth becomes less important.
There are two other factors which are quite important.
This is energy efficiency, or energy intensity.
Energy intensity declined over the last few decades.
However, the improvements in energy efficiency
has been overcompensated by economic growth,
and also by population growth.
Now it is important to understand
that there is a quite recent development which is quite worrying.
And the recent development is
that in contrast to the previous decades
we can observe an increasing carbon intensity.
The carbon intensity declined but now the carbon intensity is increasing.
This is due to the fact that in U.S., in China, in India
and even in Europe, coal becomes incredibly competitive in the power sector.
You can argue that we are meanwhile in a large renaissance of coal worldwide,
and also in the main and most important regions around the globe.
And if you analyse the data after 2010 carefully,
you will see that the renaissance of coal is ongoing
and the crucial question is, can it sustain for the next few decades.
And I will argue in my presentation, yes, it can sustain,
because we have a lot of resources and a lot of reserves underground.
The basic message of my talk will be we are not running out of fossil fuels.
Not the fossil fuels are the limiting factor in the 21st century.
The limiting factor in the 21st century
is the limiting disposal space of the atmosphere.
But here we already can acknowledge and recognise a huge challenge.
The scarcity of the fossil fuel is something nature imposes on us.
The limiting disposal space is nothing which nature imposes on us.
We have to find an international agreement
which limits the disposal space of the atmosphere.
Now this was the past, and what I would like to tell you here is,
that we are in a quite fossil fuel intensive, carbon intensive business as usual scenario.
Now in the next step I would like to communicate quite clearly,
so what should we do, or at least what are the underlying requirements
when humankind intends to limit the increase of the global mean temperature.
And within the UNFCCC framework there are basically two focal points.
One is the 2 degree target and the other one is the 1.5 degree target.
So what is the justification for the 2 or the 1.5 degree target?
And here I would like to highlight very clearly
that the IPCC does not recommend a specific target.
The task has been given to us to explore
what are the underlying technological, economic and institutional challenges.
However, the working group 2,
which is not the working group I have co-led,
it has been co-led by Chris Field,
they have come up with a kind of a categorization of risks.
Because it is impossible to assign monetary values to the climate damages,
because the information is not available,
and therefore working group 2 decided
to come with a categorization of the different risks.
For example, you have the risk
that some ecosystems might be threatened by the increase of global mean temperature.
The extreme weather events are increasing,
the floods and the droughts.
There are also some kind of a new category of risk
which is an interesting one,
and probably the most important one,
these are the large scale singular events.
The most important message I would like to convey in my lecture is,
the amount of cumulative carbon
which we release in the atmosphere in the next few decades
determines the climate in the second half of the century
and in the next century in an irreversible way.
If nature reveals its card
it might be the case that it is less harmful than we thought.
But we cannot do anything about this,
or to be a little bit more precise,
even if we would then mitigate,
we cannot reduce the risk of dangerous climate change.
The only option we have is either to adapt
or to implement some kind of geo-engineering,
which means changing the radiation balance of earth directly.
So there is some consensus
that there’s a huge difference between a 4 degree earth
where we are at risk to increase the likelihood…
that for example large scale singular events can occur.
And there is also a consensus if we try to limit the increase of global temperature
around 2 degrees we can avoid the increase of risks of these kind of impacts.
This is a kind of a precautionary principle.
It’s nothing which can be derived from an equation in natural science.
It’s a materialisation…an operationalisation….of a precautionary principle.
So nothing more can be said about this.
But what we can do is,
we can try to understand and try to figure out what does it mean,
what does it imply,
if we want to limit or if we want to limit the increase of global mean temperature
around 2 degrees.
Let me explain this a little bit more.
We have evaluated a few hundred scenarios.
And what you can see here is: a kind of a business as usual scenario.
And this emission trajectory
will increase roughly the global mean temperature around 4 degrees.
And 4 degrees is for most of my colleagues
something which is very hard to handle,
where the limits of adaptation might be achieved
when we allow the increase of global mean temperature
at this order of magnitude.
If we would go, for example, for a 3 degree target,
then you have this picture.
We need then a maximum should be achieved for emissions
around 2030 and after that we have to reduce emissions in absolute terms,
not in relation to GDP, not in relation to population.
We have to reduce emissions in absolute terms.
And at the end of the century
we have to achieve almost a carbon free society or a carbon free economy.
What about the 2 degree target?
The 2 degree target is more ambitious.
We have to achieve,
if we want to achieve it in a cost effective way,
the maximum of emissions earlier,
then we have to reduce it in absolute terms.
And in many scenarios at the end,
in the second half of the century,
we have to achieve even negative emissions.
We need some technological devices
which allows us to absorb CO2 emissions from the atmosphere.
The international community is now contemplating
to what extent the 2 degree target should be achieved,
and what are the underlying requirements.
One aspect I would like to highlight.
I am not saying we should relax the 2 degree target,
and I will not say it’s not feasible.
I will communicate in a few minutes what are the underlying requirements.
But one observation I would like to share with you is,
that in both cases, for a 3 and a 2 degree target
we need a fundamental departure from the business as usual scenario.
A fundamental departure.
And for the next 20 years we have to do exactly the same
irrespective if you want to achieve a 3 or a 2 degree target.
Now let me explain a little bit more
the relationship between the short term and the long term.
As John Maynard Keynes said: “In the long run we are all dead.”.
Therefore we might be interested in the short term.
And in particular, what we did is,
we have tried to figure out in our assessment
what are the implications if we have delayed international action.
And this is quite important in advance of Paris in 2015. Why?
So it might be the case we will achieve a very ambitious
and a binding international agreement,
and the problem is then solved.
But it could be the case that in Paris
we will not achieve such an agreement,
and then we want to inform the policy makers
what are the implications of a delay in international co-ordination and co-operation.
What you can see is there are different pathways
to achieve a 2 degree target.
And this is important to understand
that there are many cost effective ways.
It’s not just one pathway.
All these scenarios share one characteristic.
And the characteristic is: it is cost effective to start now.
And this emission reduction can be then translated
in an annual growth rate of emission reduction which is -3%.
Which is unprecedented in economic history,
because up to now we have increased emissions.
And this emission reduction profile can be also translated
in a kind of technological requirements.
And the basic message is,
we have to scale up the low carbon technologies.
And the low carbon technologies include
a broad portfolio of technological options,
ranging from renewables, energy efficiency improvements,
carbon capture and storage,
bio energy and in some parts nuclear energy.
I am not saying, and this is very important for me,
I am not saying nuclear energy is absolutely required.
What I will show in a few minutes is,
that there is an option for different nations
and for different governments to choose their own energy mix.
And there is some room of freedom here
to come up with an energy mix which will lead to a 2 degree target.
And this is quite important for us within the IPCC.
So we are not in a position,
and we want not to be in a position
to prescribe a specific energy mix for different countries.
But here I would like to further explore
what are the implications of delayed mitigation,
of delayed co-operation.
For example, if we move for the next, until 2030,
for the next decade, along the Cancun pledges,
which basically means we will increase emissions.
And here the message is,
this does not mean that the 2 degree target is then no longer feasible.
It can be achieved.
However, if we do not implement climate policy immediately,
if we postpone it, we have to do more in the future,
we impose additional costs to our children and grandchildren,
and also, this is quite important to understand,
we have to scale up carbon free technologies
even to a much larger extent.
And this rapid scale up of low carbon technologies has its own risk.
Because then we have to rely on a large scale deployment of bio energy,
which has some kind of side effects on food security and so on.
So the longer we wait,
the more costs we have to take into account,
and the more risky options we need,
and we have to rely on these more risky options.
And here you can see very clearly
that the amount of upscaling increases dramatically.
OK. Now these are the technological options.
But what about the economic costs?
There is a fundamental debate to what extent climate policy
can be reconciled with economic growth.
We have explored in the IPCC,
is economic growth consistent with the reduction of emissions?
And here I would like to bring to your attention
that the argument does not imply that we recommend economic growth.
There might be some countries
which decide no longer to rely on economic growth.
But there are many other countries, in particular the economies in transition,
who want economic growth,
and they need the information to what extent this option for economic growth
in climate policy can be reconciled.
We figured out
what are the economic costs?
And the basic message here is the following:
in the long run we have to sacrifice to a certain extent,
we have to reduce the growth rate.
If you have a growth of 2% GDP per capita per annum,
and you try to achieve a 2 degree target,
then the growth rate will be reduced by 0.06%.
Instead of 2% you have then an annual growth of 1.94%.
In absolute terms this is a lot of money.
But it does postpone economic growth,
but it’s not a necessity to sacrifice economic growth in the long run.
This is quite important to understand.
In that sense it seems to me
it is a fair summary to say:
it does not cost the world to save the planet.
Nevertheless, in the short run
many countries face a huge transition challenge.
We have to deal with distributional aspects,
the increase of carbon taxes
or the increase of carbon prices have some impacts on households.
And it would be not appropriate to communicate
that climate policy is a free lunch.
Instead I would argue climate policy is not a free lunch,
but it is a lunch worthwhile to buy.
So the next basic message is,
economic growth can be reconciled with emission reduction.
And now we have to try to figure out,
what are the implications for the different sectors.
The implications for the different sectors is
all sectors have to contribute.
But in particular climate policy
imposes a challenge for two fundamental sectors.
One is the energy supply sector.
We need a decarbonisation of the electricity sector,
by 2050 we need full decarbonisation.
And the second is, we have a strong implication,
a very strong implication for the land use sector.
Because the land use sector has to contribute a lot.
when we want to achieve negative emissions,
so we need afforestation.
We need also the use of bioenergy in the heating sector,
in the electricity sector, for the fuel sector.
And we have to combine this with carbon capture and storage,
which means, we have to capture CO2
and then we have to sequester it in one way or another.
The sequestration part is risky.
But it is even more risky if you think about large scale deployment of bioenergy.
There was a huge debate within the IPCC
to what extent we can afford 200 extra joules per year or 300 extra joules.
It depends very much on land use management.
But nevertheless for an ambitious target like a 2 degree target,
or a 1.5 degree target, the land use sector has to deliver a lot.
And this is quite important to understand,
that the land use sector can really benefit from mitigation policy.
Because then, if you have a carbon tax,
the land use sector can deliver a lot of carbon value.
This is a new business model.
But it is not the case that he will lose,
the contrary is true,
he will gain and he will benefit a lot from an ambitious climate policy.
Now a crucial question is,
and I said this from the very beginning on,
that the challenge,
the fundamental challenge is that we need international co-operation.
Why do we need international co-operation?
We need international co-operation because
nature does not impose anything on us.
If we want to avoid dangerous climate change
or at least if we want to reduce the risk of dangerous climate change,
we have to limit the cumulative amount of carbon
which we will release in the next two decades into the atmosphere.
And here for that we need an international binding agreement.
So the working group 1, which is very much consistent with working group 3 and 2,
that additional 1,000 gigatonnes CO2 can be released.
So we can say, this is the limiting disposal space of the atmosphere.
And in a business as usual scenario
we would achieve this limit in the next three or four decades.
So therefore we need this departure from the business as usual scenario.
But this has very strong implications.
The implication is that it is best to understand the atmosphere as a global commons.
Currently it’s a common pool resource,
because everybody can use the atmosphere
without paying any price,
and without taking into account the damages for the future generations.
So in that sense it’s kind of a free land.
If you want to understand the atmosphere as a global commons,
then we have to come up with a scheme
which distributes the user rights to different people.
And this is nothing new.
This is something which is the basic understanding of market economies.
If you feel that there is some scarcity
then you have to assign a price,
because otherwise neither the investors nor the consumers
nor the governments will understand
that the atmosphere is a scarce resource.
And this is the reason why most economies feel
that in the long run we need a reliable carbon pricing scheme.
I would like to raise awareness a little bit more about this issue.
And this is my favourite slide
and the key message which I would like to communicate here very clearly.
This slide clearly shows the fundamental of the economics of climate change.
What you can see here is the zero line,
and below the zero line you can see
the resource and reserves of coal, oil and gas.
This is what we have underground.
And then you have here the amount of carbon
which we have released into the atmosphere since industrialisation.
And this has caused an increase of global mean temperature,
roughly around 0.8 degree.
So this is the amount of carbon
which we might extract from the ground.
We will not extract all the coal underground,
because the extraction costs are increasing.
However, this will cause
an increase of global mean temperature around 4 degree.
So if we want to understand the atmosphere as a global commons
we have to make sure that the majority,
the majority of resource and reserves
of coal, oil and gas, remain underground.
This is the fundamental challenge.
And we have to incentivise people to find new carbon-free technologies.
And this is the reason why we need this kind of carbon pricing scheme.
I know if you talk to the national politicians
and ask for implementation of a carbon tax
or an emissions trading scheme, people are quite skeptical
and reluctant to implement such a scheme.
And if you think about Paris in 2015
we might agree roughly on a low stabilisation target like a 2 degree target.
But when it comes to the policy package
which should be implemented in Europe, China and the U.S.
we might have…and we have to face a quite heated debate.
However, this heated debate is unavoidable,
because in the end we have to understand what are the implications.
And now I would like to skip a few slides
and then this is my last slide
which I show in my capacity as a co-chair of IPCC,
and then I will say something on carbon pricing.
This is my last slide.
Because this last slide shows
that there are a few carbon pricing schemes around the globe.
We have in Europe and E.U. an emissions trading scheme.
In two provinces and five cities in China we have an emissions trading scheme.
Today we got in the news that California and British Columbia
want to link their emissions trading schemes.
There are a lot of countries who have already implemented carbon taxation.
What I am saying is, and what I would like to communicate very clearly is,
how essential carbon pricing and carbon taxation is.
This is an agreement,
almost an agreement with all the authors within the IPCC.
Now I would like to change my hat now.
I do not talk as a co-chair of IPCC,
I would like to share with you a few insights on the European climate policy.
Now in Europe we have an emissions trading scheme.
Unfortunately this scheme was so far …
I wouldn’t say a failure….but at least it needs a fix.
Since the financial crisis
it happened that the cap which has been defined by the Commission
was for a few years not binding, which means the cap was …
the emissions in the system are quite low,
the cap was not binding, and we had an oversupply of permits.
Now what happened?
The investors in the market formed expectation
what will happen with this oversupply in the future?
And in addition to that the investors and the traders in the market
formed expectation what will happen in the E.U. with the 2030 target?
Both are quite uncertain.
And the Commission has not stabilised the expectations,
the contrary was true.
The Commission communicated very mixed and confusing messages.
And this has mainly driven the decline of the price in the EUETS.
So we did some econometric studies and it turned out
it was not the market fundamentals like the decline of the business cycle,
like the deployment of renewables, like the inflow of the CVM.
It was these destabilised expectations
which caused the dramatic decline of the price in the EUETS.
So basically the EUETS is no longer a device,
an institution which allows the investors
to find the most cost effective technologies.
The EUETS is now basically
where people share and trade expectations
about the future of climate policy in Europe.
The price is now around €3/tonne CO2, very very low.
The expectations are quite low.
So this is something which is quite important to understand.
We have to fix the EUETS,
otherwise Europe will not be credible
in the negotiations in Paris in 2015.
And we have to fix the problem,
and we have to show the world how to fix this problem,
because, as I told you in China,
two cities and five provinces have already implemented an emissions trading scheme.
And it seems to me it is our responsibility to show them how to fix this.
How can we fix this? We can continue the discussion.
My proposal would be the following.
In the European Emissions Trading Scheme
we need as soon as possible a minimum price.
Because if we have a minimum price
this is a clear signal to all the investors
what they can expect at a minimum from the EUETS.
And we have to communicate very clearly
that this minimum price should increase.
In addition to that we need a reasonable target by 2030.
This would be from my point of view an immediate fix.
And then we need a discussion to include more sectors in the EUETS.
And also we have to auction the permits in order to raise revenues.
Now this would be from my point of view a kind of a policy package
which would allow Europe to be perceived as a credible climate negotiator.
And this is from my point of view absolutely necessary
in order to support the role,
the leading role of Europe in these negotiations.
But this is just one step.
From my point of view, the crucial problem,
the short term problem of climate policy for most politicians is the following.
The costs of mitigation occur now,
but the benefits of climate policy will be benefits of the future generations.
This is very hard to sell for real world policy makers.
Therefore, it might be worthwhile to think
a little bit more about what kind of short term co-benefits,
or what kind of short term benefits could be reaped by a climate policy.
Or the other way around,
can we find a way that finance ministers
become more interested in carbon taxation or carbon pricing,
even if they do not believe in climate policy, or in climate change?
And it seems to me there are a few options.
One option is, in particular in China, the reduction of local air pollution.
China is implementing a climate policy
because they have a very pressing issue
to reduce the local air pollution,
because local air pollution in Beijing
is meanwhile a major disadvantage for this location.
So therefore China is interested in implementing an emissions trading scheme.
In other countries, in economies in transition,
you have a huge and an increasing demand for infrastructure.
But who should finance this infrastructure?
And this infrastructure is necessary
if you want to increase the competitiveness of these countries.
These countries cannot finance the infrastructure
because of the increasing public debt level,
the limiting ability to tax capital,
and the social problems caused by an additional taxation of labour.
So in the end I would like to argue taxing bads is better than taxing goods.
Instead of taxing productive investments,
instead of taxing labour,
instead of increasing public debt,
the revenues from carbon pricing
can be used to finance infrastructure
to increase the competitiveness of these countries.
This would be one way to show the people
that there are even short term benefits of a climate policy.
And at the same time you can reconcile the long term commitment,
the long term needs with the short term benefits.
And this might be a way that real world politicians
can sell this kind of policy much more effectively to the people.
Now I am very close to the end of my talk.
So in the last, in my last part
I would like to explain that the lack of political will
is not something which is caused by the cynicism,
the fatalism of the policy makers.
They have to deal with a very challenging issue,
the short terms costs,
the costs for mitigation which are now a pressing issue,
and the long term benefits.
And to help the politicians to bridge the long term
with the short term requirements,
seems to me, is one way to sell climate policy
and embed climate policy in a sustainable development,
and also in a kind of a reasonable economic policy.
Ladies and gentlemen, let me come to an end.
In my first part, I had basically three messages.
The first message was, emissions are rising,
and we are in the middle of a huge coal renaissance.
The second message was,
we need a fundamental departure from the business as usual scenario.
And the third message was,
we can afford this if we have a broad portfolio of technologies
and the economic costs are in a reasonable order of magnitude.
It does not cost the world to save the planet.
However, it requires a lot of political cleverness,
a lot of political will.
And it seems to me the huge challenge of climate policy
is fundamentally a political issue.
And in the end climate policy is affordable,
but it requires a lot of political cleverness and a lot of courage and a lot of effort.
Thank you very much.
0:00:00 / 0:00:00
Prof. Dr. Ottmar Edenhofer, Co-Chair, IPCC Working Group III
Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change